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Introduction∗ 
 
In Spring 2014, Mississippi Delta Project’s Economic Development team researched the 
causes of and possible solutions for the high crime rate in Helena-West Helena, 
Arkansas (“Helena”). In connection with this research, the team conducted a series of 
interviews with Helena citizens and community leaders. The team’s research and 
interviews revealed that recent events had frayed the community’s faith in its public 
institutions. In October 2011, the now well-known federal drug investigation called 
Operation Delta Blues culminated with the arrest of five local law enforcement officials 
on charges of attempted racketeering.1 During its investigation, the Economic 
Development team learned of additional allegations of mismanagement and wrongdoing 
by public officials, including a pattern of dismissing criminal cases for lack of a timely 
trial which enabled alleged criminals to walk free, and repeated ethics violations by at 
least one Phillips County judge. The team decided to build upon its previous report, 
released in Fall 2014, which focused on crime-reduction strategies for Helena, by 
offering a more pointed analysis and strategies to address these problems of corruption. 
The goal of this report is to provide policy-makers in Helena with options for addressing 
corruption in order to reduce the negative economic impact that stem from such 
corruption and increase community trust in public institutions. 
Helena: Economic Context 
 
Helena is a town in northwestern Arkansas located on the western banks of the 
Mississippi River, about seventy miles southwest of Memphis, Tennessee. Helena is the 
county seat of Phillips County. As of 2013, the county had about 20,399 residents,2 of 
whom about 12,000 live in Helena.3 Once a successful port town that exported 
Arkansas’ agricultural and manufactured goods to the rest of the U.S., Helena 
experienced the effects of globalization and mechanization in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  This resulted in a loss of industry, economy and jobs that Helena still 
has yet to recover from and caused detrimental effects to the community.4 As of 2013, 
                                                
∗ This report was prepared by Joe Milner and Tara Norris, members of the Harvard Law School 
Mississippi Delta Project under the supervision of Desta Reff, Harvard Delta Clinical Fellow. The following 
students from the Harvard Mississippi Delta Project were involved in researching and drafting the report: 
Joe Breen, Chris Burkhalter, Linda Liu, Mike Mattheiss, Grace Signorelli, April Wang, and Ian Wells. 
1 Ashley Blackstone, Press Conference Names Helena-West Helena Officers Arrested, THV 11 (Oct. 11, 
2011, 5:09 PM), http://www.thv11.com/news/article/176587/2/Press-conference-names-Helena-West-
Helena-officers-arrested. 
2 Phillips County, Arkansas, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:12 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05/05107.html. 
3 Helena-West Helena (city) QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:12 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05/0531190.html. 
4 See Luke Jones, Quest for Helena Port Tenants Took 20 Years, ARKANSAS BUSINESS (April 29, 2013 
12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/92185/quest-for-helena-port-tenants-took-20-
years?page=all; see also Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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over 40% of Helena’s residents lived below the federal poverty line.5 Helena’s public 
institutions have failed to reverse this economic decline and, as highlighted above, have 
contributed to Helena’s problems by tolerating and facilitating corruption. 
 
Corruption 
 
“Corruption” is traditionally defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”6 
Corruption encompasses a wide range of behavior, including the acceptance of bribes, 
the use of public resources for personal reasons, or selective enforcement of the law.7 
While corruption may vary in form, its economic effects are universal. According to the 
World Bank, corruption adds 10% to the cost of doing business across the world8 and 
has declared it to be “. . . among the greatest obstacles to economic and social 
development,”9 as it skews incentive structures for economic actors, which can lead to 
the inefficient allocation of scarce resources. When corruption creates transactional 
costs for businesses, they may choose to operate in other markets that are free of these 
costs.  Indeed, businesses have other reasons to avoid markets that are affected by 
corruption: first, corruption creates the risk of future prosecution and penalties; second, 
corruption increases business uncertainty, either by increasing the likelihood of future 
criminal liability for businesses that appease corrupt actors, or by placing law-abiding 
businesses at a comparative disadvantage relative to businesses that do engage in 
corrupt behavior.   
 
The Economic Development team did not discover any direct evidence of corruption 
involving legitimate private-sector businesses. However, the rule of law and democratic 
legitimacy are perhaps most grievously injured when neither citizens nor businesses 
can rely upon the integrity of judicial and law enforcement officers. When legal systems 
are corrupt, citizens tend to perceive their social environment and the distribution of 
social goods as unfair.10 Entrenched corruption of the public sector, including the 
judiciary and law enforcement, contributes to institutional inertia and prevents market 
                                                
5 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3. 
6 Anwar Shah, Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance 2 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3824, 
2006). 
7 See BERTRAM I. SPECTOR ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ANTICORRUPTION 
ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK 2 (2009). 
8 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., The Business Case against Corruption 1,  
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption.pdf. 
9 Corruption Hunters Rally for Action Against Fraud, WORLD BANK (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22783187~pagePK:64257043~piP
K:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html?cid=EXT_FBWB_D_EXT. 
10 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 22 
(2013). 
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reforms.11 Fortunately, studies show that reforms favoring transparency and judicial 
independence create economic growth.12 
 
As discussed above, the Economic Development team encountered instances and 
allegations of corruption in local law enforcement and the court system. The abuses 
uncovered by Operation Delta Blues fall within a traditional understanding of corruption; 
the law enforcement officials who were charged in connection with Operation Delta 
Blues admitted to accepting money from drug dealers in return for the officers’ 
protection, using their public offices for private gain.13 In interviews, the Economic 
Development team also heard allegations that Helena-West Helena police officers have 
engaged in uses of excessive force against citizens.  
 
Signs of corruption also have appeared in the court system. For example, one of the 
currently presiding judges in Phillips County has been sanctioned repeatedly for ethics 
violations over the course of the last eight years but has managed to retain his office.14 
The court system’s disorganization provides opportunities for additional abuses. The 
court system has proven unable to manage its caseload; for instance, compared to 
criminal cases in Arkansas state courts overall, criminal cases on the Phillips County 
circuit court’s docket are nearly twice as likely to have been pending for more than two 
years.15 Many of these cases have been dismissed without a trial. This process 
potentially returns criminals to the street and undermines the rule of law. Further, the 
court system’s inability to administer justice on a routine basis undoubtedly undermines 
the public’s trust in the local government and the rule of law.   
 
This report details three broad policy recommendations in order to reduce corruption 
and restore trust in public institutions in Helena. First, Helena should consider 
implementing the use of body cameras by law enforcement officials. When 
accompanied by clear policies and strict privacy safeguards, body cameras can 
enhance transparency and reduce negative confrontations between police officers and 
citizens. Second, this report recommends that local courts should consider adopting 
case-flow management strategies. These strategies aim to increase courts’ efficiency in 
reviewing cases by reducing the amount of time and resources spent on each case. 
Third, Helena should consider proposing or supporting amendments to Arkansas’ rules 
governing judicial elections and campaign finance.  Together, these recommendations 
                                                
11 Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic 
Consequences, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jul. 1, 1999), http://www.hoover.org/research/judicial-corruption-
developing-countries-its-causes-and-economic-consequences. 
12 See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country 
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators 23 (CESifo Working Paper No. 906, 2003). 
13 See, e.g., Three Defendants Plead Guilty in Operation Delta Blues, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/littlerock/press-releases/2012/three-defendants-plead-guilty-in-
operation-delta-blues (describing the guilty plea of former Helena-West Helena police officer Robert 
Rogers). 
14 Ark. Jud. Discipline and Disability Comm’n. v. Simes, 381 S.W.3d 764, 779 (2011). 
15 ARK. JUDICIARY, SUMMARY OF FIRST CIRCUIT ACTIVE CRIMINAL CHARGES DURING THE DATES OF 
01/01/2013–12/31/2013 (2014), available at 
https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/1st%20Circuit%20Criminal_0.pdf.  
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seek to address weaknesses in Helena’s public institutions and provide suggestions 
that these institutions can undertake to build community trust.  
I. Law Enforcement Recommendations 
 
Building trust between police and the community is essential in order to reduce crime. 
The relationship between the police and low-income, minority communities is often 
characterized by distrust and fear; indeed, race and income are among the best 
predictors of evaluations of police performance.16 Half of black citizens report having 
very little or no confidence in their local police, while less than 11% express a great deal 
of confidence in their police.17 When people do not trust that their communities can 
solve problems, they tend not to report crimes, and criminal activity is allowed to 
continue without police intervention.18 Black citizens are five times more likely to report 
mistreatment by police officers.19 Additionally, low-income citizens are more likely to be 
distrustful of police than high-income citizens.20 In Helena, 75% of the population is 
black, and over 40% of the population lives below the federal poverty line.21 As a result, 
many of Helena’s citizens are likely to have poor perceptions of law enforcement, even 
in the absence of wrongdoing by law enforcement officials. These negative perceptions 
may already hinder Helena citizens from reporting crime, enabling criminals to evade 
the police and continue to contribute to Helena’s growing crime problems. 
 
Recent events in Helena provide additional support for citizens’ distrust of police and 
threaten to further erode public trust in law enforcement. In October 2011, the FBI-led 
Operation Delta Blues arrested 70 people in Phillips County on drug-related offenses, 
including five law enforcement officers, all of whom either plead guilty or were 
convicted.22 These officers accounted for about 12% of the full-time law enforcement 
officers in Helena and Phillips County.  
 
Establishing strong community trust and model police behavior are essential because 
both public perception and police behavior can have real effects on crime. The police 
rely on citizen reporting of crime in order to identify and apprehend criminals. According 
to the 2013 National Crime Victimization Survey, only 45.6% of violent crimes and 
                                                
16 See Brown & Benedict, Perceptions of the Police: Past Findings, Methodological Issues, Conceptual 
Issues and Policy implications, 25 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 543, 547, 550 
(2002), available at http://www.observatoriodeseguranca.org/files/p543.pdf. 
17 Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the Police, 45 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 494, 498 (1999). 
18 See Robert C. Davis & Nicole J. Harrison, Willingness to Report Crimes: The Role of Ethnic Group 
Membership and Community Efficacy, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 564, 577 (2003). 
19 Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 17, at 502. 
20 Brown & Benedict, supra note 16, at 550.   
21 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
22 Helena Ex-Officer’s Drug Conviction Upheld, THV 11 (May 8, 2014, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.thv11.com/story/news/local/2014/05/08/marlene-kalb-conviction-upheld/8856439/; see also 
Fourth Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Operation Delta Blues, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Mar. 16, 
2012), http://www.fbi.gov/littlerock/press-releases/2012/fourth-police-officer-pleads-guilty-in-operation-
delta-blues. 
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36.1% of property crimes were reported to the police.23 While in many cases victims do 
not report crimes because they find alternative means to resolve the issue, 20% of the 
unreported crimes nationwide between 2006 and 2010 were unreported because the 
victim believed the police would not or could not help.24   
 
A recent survey in Pennsylvania illustrated the link between public trust and reporting 
of crimes.  In the survey, Philadelphia residents’ responses indicated that, if they were 
victims of crimes, they would either hesitate to contact the police or decide not to 
contact the police at all. In contrast, residents of nearby counties indicated that they 
were much more willing to contact the police to report a crime. Philadelphia residents 
also exhibited a confidence level in police that was 22% lower than that of residents in 
nearby counties.25 Philadelphia residents appeared to evaluate police integrity and 
competence less well than their county counterparts. Taken together, these results 
reveal that residents who distrust law enforcement’s ability and willingness to enforce 
the law professionally may be less likely to report crimes. When these crimes go 
unreported, law enforcement cannot identify and apprehend criminals, and criminals 
remain on the streets. Without community trust, the police cannot succeed in fighting 
crime in Helena. In order to reverse this trend, Helena must implement changes in law 
enforcement policy that fight corruption and restore the public’s trust in the integrity of 
Helena’s law enforcement. This report recommends that Helena (1) adopts the use of 
body cameras by law enforcement officials, including clear policies regarding when and 
how the cameras should be used and (2) implements community policing strategies in 
order to build community trust.  
A. Body Cameras as a Tool to Build Community Trust 
 
In order to build public trust, police departments need to increase transparency and 
accountability for their behavior. By implementing video surveillance of officer activities, 
police departments can better police citizens and themselves. People who are aware 
that someone might be watching become more prone to socially acceptable behavior 
and a heightened need to comply to rules.26 For example, many schools have installed 
security cameras to incentivize students to behave in a socially acceptable manner; 
installation has correlated with reduced school-related deaths, sexual attacks, and 
weapons on school grounds.27 Implementing video surveillance in public areas has 
been shown to correlate with a 51% decrease in vehicle-related property crime.28 In 
                                                
23 BUREAU JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.,CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2013 7 (2014), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv13.pdf. 
24 Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes Per Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010, BUREAU JUST. 
STAT. (Aug. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm. 
25 Id. 
26 TONY FARRAR,, SELF-AWARENESS TO BEING WATCHED AND SOCIALLY-DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR: A FIELD 
EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECT OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS ON POLICE USE-OF-FORCE, POLICE FOUNDATION 3 
(2013). 
27 J. Scott Granberg-Rademacker et al., Do School Violence Policies Matter? An Empirical Analysis of 
Four Approaches to Reduce School Violence, 4 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 4, 11 (2007). 
28 FARRAR, supra note 26, at 4. 
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addition, studies have shown that speed cameras reduce speeding by 65% and serious 
traffic accidents by 44%.29  
 
Body cameras are highly effective in influencing both police and citizen behavior. 
Following the Rodney King incident, in which an unarmed black male was beaten by 
police, the Police Foundation ran a yearlong study in the Rialto Police Department 
(RPD) in which they concluded that placing body cameras on police officers would 
reduce the frequency of use of force.  Their research found that police shifts that used 
body cameras used force half as many times as police shifts without cameras30 and 
officers used weapons only when physically threatened. Conversely, in police shifts 
without cameras, officers used weapons in 5 out of 17 incidents in which they were not 
physically threatened.31  When police used body cameras and had a physical 
confrontation with a citizen, the officers never initiated physical contact, while in shifts 
without body cameras, officers initiated physical contact in 4 out of 17 instances. 
Compared to the previous year, the RPD’s reduced their use of force by 250% and 
complaints to the police department decreased from 28 to 3.32 By reducing police use of 
force, body cameras help the police eliminate negative interactions with the public and 
thereby help to repair community trust in law enforcement. 
 
In the wake of controversial citizen deaths at the hands of police officers, body cameras 
have become a widely discussed tool for improving relations between law enforcement 
and their communities. Last August, Officer Darren Wilson of Ferguson, Missouri, killed 
Michael Brown, an unarmed eighteen-year-old, during a violent confrontation. The 
encounter gave rise to conflicting eyewitness accounts. In response, commentators 
pointed to body cameras as tools that can be used to establish an unbiased record of 
police encounters with citizens.33 Local, state, and federal officials quickly proposed 
policy solutions that incorporated the use of body cameras to reduce police use of force 
and increase accountability. In September, the St. Louis County Police began outfitting 
all of its 465 patrol officers with body cameras with the goal of reducing police abuse.34 
In December, a Missouri state legislator also proposed a bill that would require all police 
officers in the state to wear body cameras.35 At the federal level, the White House 
responded to the events in Ferguson by proposing the Body Worn Camera Partnership 
                                                
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 8 (also noting that “the rate of use of force incidents per 1,000 contacts was reduced by 2.5 times 
compared to the 12 months prior to the experimental period”). 
31 Id. at 9; see also id. at 6 (noting that these statistics are based on officers’ use-of-force incident reports, 
not independent reporting). 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 See, e.g., German Lopez, Michael Brown's family said police should adopt body cameras. They're 
right., VOX (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/16/6023481/michael-mike-brown-
ferguson-body-cameras. 
34 Paul Hampel, In Ferguson, residents begin training cameras on police, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sep. 
20 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/in-ferguson-residents-begin-training-
cameras-on-police/article_5e6b6cef-8a85-5bcd-87d6-6019390634aa.html. 
35 Dave Hon, Proposed bill would require body cams on officers, ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESSNOW (Dec. 26, 
2014, 8:21 AM), http://www.newspressnow.com/news/local_news/article_127c4902-c07b-51e9-9c6f-
ba4f208c81f5.html. 
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Program.36 If approved by Congress, the program will offer $75 million in funding to help 
purchase 50,000 body cameras across the country.  
 
Body cameras create additional benefits for law enforcement. Because body cameras 
record officers’ behavior, body cameras can also assist police departments in 
monitoring the behavior of their officers.  This is especially important in Helena-West 
Helena following the events and convictions of Operation Delta Blues. If recorded 
footage shows an officer abusing his powers, the department can take immediate 
corrective action. For example, in Phoenix, the police department fired an officer after 
the department reviewed footage revealing “repeated instances of verbal abuse, 
profanity, and threats against members of the public.”37 Even if body cameras do not 
capture direct police misbehavior, they may still deter such behavior. In the first year 
police adopted body cameras in Mesa, Arizona, use of force complaints decreased by 
75% and departmental complaints decreased by 40% from the previous year.38 
Because they know their actions are being recorded and wish to avoid negative 
outcomes like disciplinary actions, officers are more likely adhere more closely to model 
behavior. Further, by reducing complaints, body cameras also may help decrease 
litigation against law enforcement or provide greater clarity during litigation. 39 By 
eliminating litigation entirely or reducing the number of hours spent on litigation, body 
cameras can help to generate cost savings for the community.40 Many police 
departments also use body cameras in training exercises with their officers. These 
video recordings enable departments to internally observe, evaluate, and provide more 
effective suggestions and recommendations to their officers.41 
 
Recognizing the value and utility of body cameras, more police departments have 
begun to implement body camera programs. In response to a 2013 survey by the Police 
Executive Research Forum (PERF), over 25% of the police departments surveyed 
indicated that they had adopted body cameras to some degree.42 In the same year, the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) adopted body cameras in five precincts after a 
judge ruled that their stop-and-frisk practice was unconstitutional.43 In September, the 
Metropolitan Police Department of D.C began a six-month body camera pilot program 
                                                
36 Andrea Peterson, President Obama wants to spend $75 million to buy police bodycams, WASHINGTON 
POST (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/01/president-obama-
wants-to-spend-75-million-to-buy-police-bodycams/. 
37 LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf. 
38 RYAN STOKES ET AL., END OF PROGRAM EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA 
SYSTEM 1 (2013), available at http://issuu.com/leerankin6/docs/final_axon_flex_evaluation_12-3-13-. 
39 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 34. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 7. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, NY TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html.   
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and believes that the program eventually will reduce the number of complaints filed 
against police officers on an annual basis by 80%.44   
 
Helena would specifically benefit from implementing a body camera program in either or 
both of the Helena-West Helena Police Department and the Phillips County Sheriff’s 
Department. Due in part to the corrupt behavior of officers exposed by Operation Delta 
Blues, law enforcement in Helena and Phillips County suffers from a lack of public 
confidence in the departments’ integrity. Body cameras will help to address both officer 
behavior and public perception of that behavior. Officers will be less likely to act 
inappropriately if their actions are filmed, and the law enforcement departments can use 
collected video recordings to review officer behavior and provide impartial records to the 
public in the event of complaints against officers. If Helena properly sets up a body 
camera program by implementing and enforcing clear policies and procedures, Helena 
can achieve these goals at a manageable cost. 
 
Helena’s unique set of resources and limitations presents its own challenges in 
implementing body cameras. This recommendation will examine the financial, 
technological, and policy concerns of body cameras for Helena while anticipating 
potential benefits and negatives of implementation. 
Implementation in Helena 
 
In order to provide the greatest benefits to Helena, implementation of police body 
cameras must include (i) a well thought-out plan to implement body camera usage and 
(ii) forward planning to account for and control costs. 
i. A strong technological infrastructure and policy is a necessity to create an effective system. 
 
In order to properly implement body cameras it is critical that a police department has a 
very strong procedural system in place.45 Without safeguards, cameras may be used in 
an abusive manner. Given public mistrust of the police and the abuses of police powers 
that led to officers’ convictions following Operation Delta Blues, Helena should pay 
special attention to establishing and maintaining safeguards. This analysis will look at 
basic elements of camera usage and video storage before examining precautionary 
policies to prevent misuse. 
a. Camera Usage 
 
Body cameras are typically worn on the chest or lapel or around the ear. 46 They can be 
moved to other spots on the officer depending on policy. Head-mounted units offer the 
advantage of recording events from the officer’s point of view. Head-mounted cameras 
also reduce distortion that occurs when the officer is running or fighting. The Police 
                                                
44 Mike Debonis & Victoria St. Martin, D.C. police will wear body cameras as part of pilot program, 
WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-police-will-wear-body-
cameras-as-part-of-pilot-program/2014/09/24/405f7f5c-43e7-11e4-b437-1a7368204804_story.html. 
45 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 40. 
46 NAT’L INST. JUST., A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, 4 (2012) available at 
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf. 
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Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends that police departments require 
officers to keep the camera in a certain location.47 Camera models vary in terms of 
video quality, night recording ability, battery life, audio recording, and storage limits.48 A 
Department of Homeland Security focus group recommended that law enforcement 
adopt body cameras that meet minimum technical specifications.49 These specifications 
include a resolution of 640 x 480, a frame rate of 25 frames per second, a battery life of 
three hours, data storage for three hours of continuous recording, and a low lux rating or 
an infrared illuminator. Helena should evaluate camera models in the context of their 
intended use and weigh their benefits against unit cost. 
b. Video Storage 
 
Video storage means and limits vary greatly based upon the selected policy and 
available resources. Typically video is stored either on an in-house server or an online 
cloud database.50 An online cloud database may eliminate upfront server costs and 
outsource IT issues but will require payment of ongoing fees. For example, 
Evidence.com provides cloud data storage for law enforcement and is used by police 
departments in Salt Lake City, Utah; Rialto, California; and Mesa, Arizona, among 
others.51 Evidence.com offers multiple tiers of service with monthly fees ranging from 
$15 to $55 per user.52 Storing data in-house will eliminate monthly fees but will require 
Helena to purchase server units and potentially hire personnel to manage the in-house 
system. Helena also will need to establish a video retention policy that specifies how 
long footage must be retained. Storage of videos must comply with state evidentiary 
rules and be properly protected.53 PERF recommends that departments classify videos 
upon upload and be flagged as “evidentiary” if they relate to an investigation or capture 
a “confrontational encounter” with a member of the public.54 All other videos are then 
only stored temporarily. PERF notes that “60 or 90-day holding periods are common.”55 
Ashland, Virginia is a small rural town of 7,000 citizens that has adopted police body 
cameras.56 Their video storage lasts 45 days unless the video is needed for evidence.57  
Shorter holding periods would cut storage costs. However, in developing its retention 
policy Helena also should consider Arkansas public disclosure laws and the benefits 
                                                
47 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 39. 
48 NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 46, at 6. 
49 See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., WEARABLE CAMERA SYSTEMS (AEL REFERENCE NUMBER 13LE-00-SURV) 
1 (2012), available at http://storage.vievu.com/MediaKit/Wearable-Camera-Systems_SAVER.pdf. 
50 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 15. 
51 NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 46, at 33. 
52 Pricing & Purchase Information, EVIDENCE.COM, http://www.evidence.com/pricing-info/ (last visited Dec. 
31, 2014). 
53 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 16. 
54 Id. at 43. 
55 Matt Pearce, Growing use of police body cameras raises privacy concerns, LA TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-body-cameras-20140927-story.html. 
56 Shelby Mertens, Police License Plate Readers, Cell Phone Tracking and the Fourth Amendment, VA. 
FREE CITIZEN (Sept. 9, 2014), http://virginiafreecitizen.com/2014/09/09/police-license-plate-readers-cell-
phone-tracking-fourth-amendment/. 
57 Id. 
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and drawbacks to making video footage available to the public for longer periods of 
time.58  
c.  Safeguards to Prevent Abuse 
 
In developing a body camera policy, the Helena police department should carefully 
consider how to establish a series of safeguards to prevent abuse. Recorded video 
brings about privacy concerns in every step of the process.59 First, the policy should 
address when and where police should be allowed to record. These parameters will 
clarify general expectations for the cameras’ operation and limit officers’ discretion for 
operating cameras to specific situations in which video recording may violate citizens’ 
privacy rights. Many departments utilize a policy in which cameras must be turned off 
when entering private homes or while interviewing witnesses that do not give their 
express consent to be recorded.60 Seeking to balance the benefits of body cameras 
against the complications of sensitive situations, these policies seek to respect privacy 
rights and provide officers with some discretion in conducting investigative work. Other 
potential situations when restriction of camera use may be advised would include 
victims of sexual crime or others of a highly private nature.61 Helena should consider 
adopting a policy that requires officers to have their cameras on at all times during calls 
for service and encounters with citizens except when entering homes or when a citizen 
being interviewed has requested that the interview not be filmed. This policy would 
ensure both that officers are accountable for recording most of their policing activities 
and that citizens’ privacy rights are respected. The Body Worn Video Steering Group 
(“BWVSG”), an organization created to support public debate about body-worn 
cameras, has published a template policy for police use of body cameras.62 Helena 
should consider consulting BWVSG’s template policy when developing its own policy. 
 
Helena’s body camera policy also should provide strict rules regarding video upload and 
storage. According to PERF, department policy should strictly forbid officers from 
uploading body camera footage for personal use or for posting on public or social media 
websites.63 Retrieval and viewing of recordings should occur only under certain 
conditions, such as a complaint or arrest, and should follow a procedure outlined in the 
department policy.64 By establishing a clear procedure, the department can eliminate 
opportunities for abusing access to recordings. 
 
Because body-worn cameras are in the possession of officers while officers are on 
patrol, opportunities may arise where officers are tempted to tamper with the cameras 
and recordings. For example, the chief of the Daytona Beach police department 
reported that an officer repeatedly turned off his camera when encountering members of 
                                                
58 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 64. 
59 Id. at 11. 
60 See Id. at 12, 15. 
61 See Id. at 18. 
62 See Procedures and Guidelines, BODY WORN VIDEO STEERING GROUP, 
http://www.bwvsg.com/resources/procedures-and-guidelines/ (last visited July 9, 2015). 
63 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 46. 
64 Id. at 45. 
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the public.65 In addition to establishing strict policies and expectations for officer 
operation of body cameras, Helena may want to consider purchasing cameras with anti-
tampering features.66 Such features can help to ensure the integrity of the body camera 
program. Anti-tampering features and policies may also be necessary in order to ensure 
that recordings can be admitted as evidence.67  
d.  The financial cost of body cameras will be substantial for Helena. 
 
The financial cost of body cameras is perhaps the most important element in 
consideration for municipalities.  The Helena city council and police department and the 
Phillips County sheriff’s department have limited funding and must allocate their 
resources to the most pertinent issues.  Considering this, body cameras may be a 
luxury that Helena cannot afford out of its own pockets.  However, federal grant funding 
may be available which could assist in minimizing the overall costs.  The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) offers funding to assist local law enforcement through two programs. First 
is the DOJ’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program which 
offers funding to local governments for a variety of criminal justice needs, including 
equipment and technology improvement programs.68 In 2014, Helena used JAG funding 
to offset the cost of the police department’s mobile analytics software.69   The police 
department could easily re-approach JAG additional funding to support this venture. 
Second, the DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office also provides 
funding for equipment purchases through its COPS Technology Program.70 These 
funding sources should help make body cameras a financially feasible option for 
Helena. 
 
The total cost associated with implementing body cameras includes a number of 
expenses. Camera purchase is the primary upfront cost. Camera prices range from 
around $120 to $2,000 per camera.71 Most agencies tend to spend around $800 to 
                                                
65 Id. at 8. 
66 See MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFFICER OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, POLICE OFFICER BODY-
WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 12 (2014) (describing camera models 
with anti-tampering features), available at 
https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-
Worn%20Cameras.pdf 
files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf 
67 Craig E. Ferrell, The Future Is Here: How Police Officers’ Videos Protect Officers and Departments, 80 
THE POLICE CHIEF 16–18 (2013), available at 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=3139&issue
_id=102013. 
68 BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FY 
2014 LOCAL SOLICITATION 4 (2014), available at https://www.bja.gov/Funding/14JAGLocalSol.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
69 Helena-West Helena Technology Enhancement Project, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, 
http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/awardDetail?awardNumber=2014-DJ-BX-0860& 
fiscalYear=2014&applicationNumber=2014-H4054-AR-DJ&programOffice=BJA&po=BJA (last visited July 
9, 2015). 
70 COPS Technology Grants, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICE SERVICES, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=58 (last visited July 9, 2015). 
71 MILLER ET AL., supra note 37, at 32.   
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$1,200 per camera, according to PERF.72 Data storage can be more expensive, 
although the cost varies in relation to the number of cameras and the amount of time 
the cameras are used.  Depending on how often officers are filming, cloud storage 
space for the camera recordings can be very expensive.  For example, one department 
“spent $67,500 to purchase 50 cameras and will spend approximately $111,000 to store 
the video on a cloud for two years.”73 Helena’s police department is much smaller and 
would only require around 10 cameras for the use of all on-duty officers. If Helena’s 
costs were exactly proportional to the costs in the example above, a body camera 
program in Helena would be somewhere around one-fifth of the previously stated price 
for a 50-camera unit. Thus, the two-year cost for Helena could be around $35,000 to 
$40,000. Helena could reduce this cost by purchasing less expensive cameras and 
establishing a policy that officers should turn on their cameras only when interacting 
with members of the public and thereby decreasing the amount of storage needed. 
 
The final major cost to consider is the administration of the body camera program.  
Officers will need to be trained in how to properly use the devices. If Helena decides to 
manage the video storage itself, a few individuals will need extensive knowledge of the 
required computer systems and will need to spend substantial time reviewing videos 
and uploading data. Otherwise, Helena will need to pay a third-party vendor to manage 
the video storage. Determining the exact monetary cost of this time spent is too difficult 
to estimate for the purposes of this report but very important to consider when creating 
a plan to purchase and implement body cameras. Helena should consider these costs 
alongside the benefits of body cameras when determining whether to pursue such a 
program. 
 
Helena might also be well served to begin with a pilot program that distributes cameras 
only to a subset of officers. For example, Helena could assign cameras to 5 police 
officers over a six-month period to evaluate the effects the cameras may have in 
Helena. This approach would minimize the upfront cost of camera purchases and would 
give the police department time to adapt to the system. Any issues with implementation 
or problems may be discovered before fully outfitting the police force. If, after the 
conclusion of the six-month pilot period, the department recognizes that the program 
may benefit from changes to its policies and procedures, it could implement a follow-up 
six-month trial period to test these changes before launching the full program. Many 
towns have begun with pilot programs before launching a larger body camera program 
after successful experimentation. In April, the small rural town of Daleville, Indiana, 
purchased seven body cameras to be used by its police force.74  The town has now 
decided to expand the program with additional cameras.75 A similar pilot approach to 
body cameras may be a great option to make body cameras affordable and effective for 
Helena. 
                                                
72 Id.   
73 Id.   
74 Derrik Thomas, Daleville Police Department cameras reduce discrepancies, RTV6 (Aug. 20, 2014, 8:45 
PM), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/daleville-police-department-cameras-reduce-
discrepancies. 
75 Id.   
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Final Recommendation for Body Camera Implementation 
 
This report recommends that the Helena Police Department equip its officers with body 
cameras as a measure to increase accountability in local law enforcement as well as 
community trust. In connection with implementing a body camera program, Helena also 
should: 
 
1. Store its video footage on an online cloud database to eliminate upfront server 
costs and outsource IT issues. 
2. Purchase cameras with anti-tampering features to prevent officers from deleting 
video footage. 
3. Select a few police department staff to complete all uploads and review videos. 
4. Create a procedure to retrieve and view recordings under select condition such 
as complaint or arrest. 
5. Establish safeguards to prevent abuse. Develop a policy in which cameras must 
be turned off when entering private homes or while interviewing witnesses that 
do not give their express consent to be recorded. Camera use should also be 
restricted in situations of sexual crime. 
B. Community Policing 
 
Community policing is an approach to law enforcement that emphasizes cooperation 
between police officers and the community.76  Community policing emphasizes the 
connection between police officers and the communities they serve, focusing on 
problem-solving and integrating law enforcement officers into their communities.77 
Community policing is proactive: by conceiving of their job as problem-solving instead of 
merely responding to incidents, law enforcement officers are able to better understand 
and respond to the needs of their communities.  Polls of communities in which law 
enforcement have switched to a community policing approach demonstrate that it aids 
“community relations and trust in police,” including “satisfaction with policing” and 
perception of police “legitimacy.”78 
 
One important aspect of community policing is “geographic ownership”: that is, the 
assignment of officers to particular patrol areas that they “own.” Within those geographic 
areas, law enforcement should have flexibility to determine the best way to identify and 
address problems.79 To encourage strong relationships between officers and their areas 
                                                
76 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 15-16 (1994), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf; Community 
policing was described in the Mississippi Delta Project’s previous report, Crime Reduction in Helena, 
Arkansas: Analysis and Recommendations, at pp. 9–11. 
77 Does Community Policing Work?, POLICEMAG.COM (Dec. 1, 2005) 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2005/12/does-community-policing-work.aspx. 
78 Charlotte Gill et al., Community-oriented policing: a systematic review, 10 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMNOLOGY 399, 400 (2014), available at 
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/627/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11292-014-9210- 
y.pdf?auth66=1410647077_073366a2713645d16d2995a856884702&ext=.pdf. 
79 Nadine Connell et al., Can a Community Policing Initiative Reduce Serious Crime? 11 POLICE 
QUARTERLY 127, 134 (2008). 
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of the community, law enforcement officers should be assigned a permanent beat when 
possible.80  As they become acquainted with residents, officers will be better able to 
work with community organizations to engage in problem-solving activities like cleaning 
up neglected areas—which has both crime-reduction and other community benefits—
and organizing neighborhood watches and other mechanisms to prevent and address 
crime.81  
 
Community policing is a two-way street: law enforcement officers must engage with 
community members, and police departments should have a mechanism to allow 
community members to reach out to them. Technology can help ease the burden of 
engaging with law enforcement, especially in a largely rural community like Helena. For 
example, social media or “online police reporting” systems can be established to allow 
citizens to report non-emergency criminal behavior.82 Moreover, online resources can 
also be used to collect feedback about police perception of the Helena police force and 
the community’s priorities.83 
II. Judicial System Recommendations 
Caseflow Management 
A. Introduction 
 
Another problem that has led to increased public corruption and distrust in the justice 
system is inefficient and backlogged courts. The struggles of the Phillips County courts 
to deal fairly and efficiently with its overloaded docket has hamstrung Helena’s ability to 
put criminal offenders behind bars and contributed to the erosion of public trust in the 
criminal justice system. In July 2012, 44% of the criminal cases on the Phillips County 
circuit court’s docket had been pending for more than two years, compared with a 
statewide average of 27% in 2011.84 The court dealt with this extreme overload by 
holding a one-time emergency special session and dropping more than 200 felony 
cases. 85 However, by the end of 2013, 48% of criminal charges on Phillips County’s 
docket had been pending for more than two years, and the total number of charges 
                                                
80 Allison Chappell, The Philosophical Versus Actual Adoption of Community Policing: A Case Study, 34 
CRIM. JUST. REVIEW 5, 7 (2009). 
81 Id. 
82 See Indrajit Basu, Social Media Elevates Community Policing, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Social-Media-Elevates-Community-Policing.html (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2014). 
83 This idea was first proposed in the previous Mississippi Delta Project report on Helena, Crime 
Reduction in Helena, Arkansas: Analysis and Recommendations, at p. 10. 
84 Chad Day and Cathy Frye, Audit: More work needed in Phillips County courts, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2012, 4:15 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/ 
sep/08/audit-more-work-needed-phillips-county-co-20120908/. 
85 Chad Day and Emily Walkenhorst, Phillips County drops 197 felony cases, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (June 21, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://m.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/jun/ 
21/phillips-county-drops-197-felony-cases-20120621/. 
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pending had increased by 43% from the beginning of 2013.86 This chronic backlog puts 
pressure on the courts to clear cases from their dockets by any means possible. Judges 
and prosecutors may be tempted to support dismissals in order to ease this backlog, 
even if such actions create an uneven application of justice or allow criminals to remain 
on the streets. As a result, the public may perceive the courts to implement justice 
unevenly or sporadically. As with public perception of law enforcement, a decline in 
public perception of the courts could lead citizens to underreport crimes. The 
combination of underreported crime and dismissals of cases without trials would 
contribute to Helena’s crime crisis. As it becomes apparent that the justice system 
cannot handle Helena’s problems, the community will lose faith in the criminal justice 
system’s ability to uphold the rule of law. 
 
In conjunction with this heavy backlog, court documents commonly and continually have 
been mismanaged. For example, in the midst of a backlog on the traffic docket, a 
Phillips County District Court judge recently dismissed 20 DWI charges because current 
City Attorney Chalk Mitchell could not find the case files.87  In other instances, large 
numbers of cases were reported to have been voluntarily dismissed. In interviews, one 
court official asserted that defendants whose cases had been dismissed claimed to 
have “worked it out” with the former city attorney.88 The city attorney never informed the 
court of these arrangements. While no formal misconduct charges have ever been 
brought against Helena’s former city attorney or prosecutor, these arrangements, made 
possible by the combination of a heavy backlog and file mismanagement in Phillips 
County, further perpetuate a lack of transparency and fairness in the system and only 
serve to foster more public distrust.  
 
Helena’s high crime rate, history of case mismanagement, and past exposure to public 
corruption call for more enduring changes to the way the courts manage their caseload. 
A study by the National Center for State Courts on the causes of judicial efficiency 
found that “both speed and backlog are determined in large part by established 
expectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys.”89 
According to one court official, “When a case doesn’t go through the system properly, 
there’s a lot of revenue lost.”90 Cases that are voluntarily dismissed through out-of-court 
arrangements waste county resources on preliminary hearings but do not recoup those 
costs through the fees and fines that would be realized in a case carried to its 
conclusion in the courts. Improved caseflow management can save time and resources 
                                                
86 ARK. JUDICIARY, SUMMARY OF FIRST CIRCUIT ACTIVE CRIMINAL CHARGES DURING THE DATES OF 
01/01/2013–12/31/2013 (2014), available at 
https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/1st%20Circuit%20Criminal_0.pdf.  
87 Chad Day and Cathy Frye, No files, so court dismisses 20 cases, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Jul. 
10, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/jul/10/no-files-so-court-dismisses-20-
cases-20120710/. 
88 Interview in Helena-West Helena, Ark. (Mar, 27, 2014), notes on file with the Mississippi Delta Project. 
89 THOMAS CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE CTS, 54 (1978). 
90 Chad Day and Cathy Frye, Dearth of funds hinders justice, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (May 20, 
2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2012/may/20/dearth-funds-hinders-justice-
20120520/. 
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and increase public trust in the court. The Phillips County circuit and district courts can 
improve their caseflow management systems by (1) increasing the capacity of its 
personnel, (2) providing adequate training to personnel, and (3) enacting caseflow 
standards.  
B. Recommendations 
i. Increase Capacity of Personnel 
 a. Appointing a Court Manager or Case Coordinator 
 
The Phillips County courts can improve caseflow management by increasing capacity of 
personnel either through hiring new staff or investing in professional development for 
current staff. If the courts do not already have a court manager or case coordinator, 
hiring one or repurposing current staff could improve courtroom accuracy and efficiency. 
In typical caseflow management models, the judge and the court manager or case 
coordinator work together to develop and implement a deliberate approach to caseflow 
management.91 The case coordinator helps the judges to monitor the progression of 
cases and keep them on schedule from filing through post-disposition. The case 
coordinator can also keep track of record submissions, manage the judge’s trial 
schedules, and measure the court’s caseflow performance.   
 
Courts throughout Arkansas have hired court managers and reaped the benefits. 
Arkansas’ 19th East Judicial Circuit, which covers Carroll County, has had a court 
manager since 2011.92 According to a case study of the 19th East Circuit, “[a]ggressive 
caseflow management . . . provides timely dispositions of cases and due process to 
litigants.”93 The results support this conclusion. Despite having only a single judge and 
dealing with a caseload comparable to the one in Phillips County, the 19th East Circuit 
has dealt with cases much quicker than the Phillips County Circuit Court. For example, 
at the end of 2013 only 17% of the criminal charges on the 19th East Circuit’s docket 
had been pending for more than two years.94 In contrast, 48% of the criminal charges 
on the Phillips County Circuit Court’s docket had been pending for more than two years. 
Neighboring St. Francis County, whose Circuit Court hired a court manager seven years 
ago, saw similar results.  At the end of 2013, only 30% of the criminal charges on St. 
Francis County’s docket had been pending for more than two years.  
 b. Provide Caseflow Management Training for Personnel 
 
                                                
91 See Richard B. Hoffman, Beyond the Team: Renegotiating the Judge-Administrator Partnership, 15 
THE JUST SYS. J. 652, 658 (1991). 
92 Berryville woman a graduate of court management program, CARROLL COUNTY NEWS (Sept. 3, 2011), 
http://www.carrollconews.com/story/1759063.html. 
93 NADINE HOLLAND, IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY: THE WORKLOAD OF A ONE-JUDGE COURT, INST. CT. MGMT.,  
39 (2014), available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/2014/The%20
Workload%20of%20a%20One-Judge%20Court.ashx 
94  ARK. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CIRCUITS FROM 01/01/2013 THROUGH 12/31/2013 — NINETEENTH CIRCUIT 
EAST, available at https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/ 
19th%20E%20Circuit%20Criminal.pdf. 
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Even if courts already have a court manager or comparable staff that focus on records 
and caseflow management, it is still possible to optimize this position by taking 
advantage of existing professional development programs that can train staff in best 
practices and help them introduce more efficient systems to the court. Trainings help 
case management staff develop skills and knowledge that are necessary for improving 
case flow management. Typically, the training curriculum covers topics such as the 
fundamental concepts in case flow management, technology, leadership, and human 
resources. A number of universities and organizations offer training programs that give 
participants the opportunity to become certified upon program completion.  
 
A new court manager would benefit from entering the Arkansas Court Manager 
Program.95 Offered by the Arkansas Judiciary’s Administrative Office of the Court, the 
Court Manager Program trains court managers in the fundamental principles of 
caseflow management; methods used to manage technology projects, human 
resources, and financial resources; and the use of CourTools, a software package 
created by the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) to help courts measure 
performance.96 The program consists of six 2.5-day seminars spread over three years. 
The seminars are held in Little Rock, and program costs consist of a $150 tuition fee as 
well as travel, lodging, and eating expenses. The next rotation of seminars will begin in 
June 2017.97 The Carroll County court manager, discussed above, graduated from the 
Arkansas Court Manager Program in 2011. As of May 2014, 70 of Arkansas’ 121 Trial 
Court Assistants had participated in this program.98 
 
Other educational programs also exist and may be worth consideration depending on 
the courts’ needs and the background of the court personnel. American University’s 
Justice Programs Office offers a one-week, 30-hour certificate program. Main courses 
include Judicial System Administration and Technology Applications to the Justice 
System.99 Organizations such as the Justice Management Institute, located in Arlington, 
Virginia, offer training workshops that range in length from sixty minutes to two days.100 
Alternatively, NCSC offers certification courses that can be completed entirely online. 
Some courses offer certification in the Certified Court Management Program and cost 
$595, while others do not offer certification but can be taken for free. All courses may be 
taken at any point during the three months following registration.101 
 
                                                
95 See Court Management Program, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/ 
administration/education/court-management-program (last visited July 9, 2015). 
96 CourTools: Giving the Courts the Tools to Measure Success, COURTOOLS 
http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CourTools/CourTools_Trial_Implementing_CourTools.a
shx (last visited July 9, 2015).  
97 Judicial Branch Education Calendar 2015, ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/ 
sites/default/files/JudicialBranchEducationCalendar2015.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015). 
98 HOLLAND, supra note 93, at 40. 
99 Certificate Program, AM. U. SCHOOL OF PUB. AFF., http://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/certificate.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
100 Case Management Training, THE JUST. MGMT. INST., http://www.jmijustice.org/education-training-
3/case-management-education-2/ (last visited July 9, 2015). 
101 Court Management, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Management.aspx 
(last visited July 9, 2015). 
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In addition, a wealth of resources for case management personnel are available online 
for free or a nominal fee. For instance, the National Association for Court Management 
(“NACM”) offers free recordings of sessions from management conferences. In addition, 
members of the NACM have access to published periodicals such as the Court 
Manager and the Court Express.102 The National Center for State Courts also offers an 
extensive list of free resources for case management staff. The resources range from 
reports on best practices and recommendations for court management to studies on the 
implementation of electronic recordings in court systems.103  
 
If caseflow management personnel are unable to participate in the Arkansas Court 
Manager Program or another formal certification program, then the personnel still would 
benefit from reviewing some combination of free online courses and resources. For 
example, staff members who wish to expand their management skills could review 
NCSC’s online course entitled “A First Course in Effective Supervision”104 and any of 
the caseflow management guides available on NCSC’s website.105 While the benefits of 
in-person instruction and certification should not be discounted, these resources may 
help acquaint court personnel with helpful concepts like improving communication and 
teamwork within the court system and monitoring court performance. Court personnel 
can use these concepts to improve caseflow management in the Phillips County courts 
without incurring significant expenses. 
ii. Implement Caseflow Standards 
 
Once court personnel have become acquainted with the basic concepts of caseflow 
management, they should develop standards to guide their implementation of caseflow 
management. If executed properly, these standards lead to “a faster, more cost-
effective, and higher quality trial court process in [the] court.”106 Standards that a court 
can employ to increase the efficiency of its case management system include early 
court intervention, differentiated case management, fixed trial dates, and data 
collection.107 
 a. Early Court Intervention 
 
Early court intervention and continuous case control require the court, not the parties, to 
take responsibility for the progress of cases from filing through post-disposition. Early 
court intervention generally involves proactive management of the pretrial process in 
order to reduce the amount of time between filing and disposition. Courts practicing 
                                                
102 Resources, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CT. MGMT., https://nacmnet.org/resources/index.html (last visited July 9, 
2015). 
103 Caseflow Management Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 
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105 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 103. 
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107 See id. at 3. 
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early court intervention may require counsel to schedule preliminary hearings or status 
meetings or even jointly present a discovery/case management plan to the court. A 
study of 37 trial courts concluded that early case intervention by the court correlates 
with shorter case times overall, reducing costs to both the parties and the court.108 
Another study found that courts practicing early court intervention reduced the amount 
of time to disposition by 1.5 to 2 months for cases lasting at least nine months.109 The 
court manager then can maintain continuous control of cases through periodic case 
reviews. This proactive approach to controlling litigation enables courts to reduce case 
processing times. For example, faced with demographic shifts and a growing caseload, 
in the early 1990s the circuit court in Fairfax, Virginia, implemented a form of early court 
intervention called a structured delay reduction program.110 Under this program, the 
court controlled the pace of litigation by checking in on the status of the case within 50 
days after initial filing, holding a status conference within 100 days after filing during 
which the judge assigned the case to a differentiated case management track, and 
setting a limit on the date on which the trial may occur. As a result of these changes, the 
court was able to reduce its backlog to manageable levels by 1996 despite a growing 
volume of cases.111  
 
The Phillips County courts can adopt an early intervention standard and tailor it to their 
specific needs. While the individual manifestations of an early intervention standard may 
vary based on a court’s individual circumstances, courts adopting this standard share a 
common philosophy of proactively guiding cases from filing to disposition. All courts can 
take charge of cases at the beginning of the process by scheduling meetings with 
counsel to work out a timeline for the case. Depending on Phillips County’s individual 
needs, the courts could build 50-day “check-ins” into the timeline in order to ensure that 
counsel are on track to be ready for the scheduled trial date. If the courts identify 
discovery as a common cause of unnecessary delay in their cases, they could require 
counsel to plan and establish parameters to limit discovery. Such tactics can help 
Phillips County proactively manage its caseload. 
 b. Differentiated Case Management 
 
Differentiated case management (“DCM”) enables courts to structure their time more 
efficiently by managing cases according to their complexity. In a traditional system, 
courts treat all cases alike procedurally and generally address cases in the order they 
are filed. Through DCM, the court determines upfront the amount of attention each case 
is going to need and applies an appropriate timetable.112 Some courts have pre-defined 
tracks based on whether the case is going to require conferences and hearings, or even 
                                                
108 JOHN GOERDT ET AL., REEXAMINING THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 39 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS, 55 (1991). 
109 JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT 52 (1996). 
110 See WILLIAM E. HEWITT ET AL., COURTS THAT SUCCEED: SIX PROFILES OF SUCCESSFUL COURTS 42 
(1990). 
111 DAVID STEELMAN ET AL., CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT: THE HEART OF COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 3 (2004). 
112 Id. at 4. 
  22 
more additional attention.113 The Fairfax County Circuit Court mentioned above 
assigned cases to one of two tracks.114 Cases presenting complex legal issues or that 
demand lengthy discovery periods were assigned to a “complex cases” track. For these 
cases, the track mandated a number of pretrial stages, including a mandatory 
settlement conference. However, the judge exercised discretion to set completion dates 
for each pretrial stage. This enabled the court to tailor the track to the specific 
complexities of the case. All other cases were assigned to a standard track with 
predetermined dates for each pretrial stage. Other courts’ experiences have 
demonstrated the benefits of adopting DCM. In the first year after adopting DCM for 
criminal cases, courts in Pierce County, Washington, resolved 88% of their drug cases 
within 90 days.115 In the prior year, Pierce County courts had resolved only 11% of their 
drug cases within 90 days.116 Similarly, courts in St. Paul, Minnesota, reduced their 
pending civil caseload by 94% within 8 months of adopting a DCM program.117 
 
Phillips County can develop an effective DCM program in order to allocate court 
resources appropriately among routine and complex cases. The courts can identify their 
“typical” cases and establish a preset timeline that would be appropriate for typical 
cases. The courts then can implement and enforce this track for most of their cases, 
saving them time from developing case timelines on a case-by-case basis. Separately, 
the courts can identify kinds of cases that usually require a longer timeline and either 
assign them to a separate track for complex cases or evaluate their needs on a case-
by-case basis. By determining these approaches ahead of time, the Phillips County 
courts can establish expectations of timeliness and efficiency among court participants 
and save court resources by preventing case-by-case timeline planning and 
unnecessary continuances. 
 c. Fixed Trial Dates 
 
Setting fixed trial dates and limiting continuances is another way to allow parties and the 
court to operate more efficiently. Under this policy, the court establishes fixed trial dates 
at the outset and grants continuances only in exceptional circumstances. Fixed trial 
dates create expectations among prosecutors, counsel, and other trial participants that 
the trial will occur when scheduled. If the court fails to support this expectation by 
allowing trial dates to slip, case participants “will not be prepared” for trial and will 
continue to request unnecessary continuances.118 Enforcing this expectation enables 
the court to eliminate unnecessary continuances and shorten the amount of time it takes 
to resolve a case.  
 
The Fairfax County Circuit Court in Fairfax, Virginia, adopted this strategy to manage a 
growing civil caseload in the 1980s. The court implemented a fixed trial date plan in 
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order to control the amount of time it took the court to process its cases. The plan 
required trials for all standard cases to occur within a year of filing and trials for complex 
cases to occur within 18 months of filing.119 In order to meet these goals, the circuit 
court administrator proactively managed cases’ progress.120 The court exercised 
increased control over discovery, required status conferences to be held by the 
hundredth day after filing, and required the parties to hold settlement conferences.121 
These processes enabled the court to aim for fixed trial dates and limit the need for 
continuances. As a result, the court increased the percentage of civil cases resolved 
within one year from 50% to 78%.122 
 
Given that the Phillips County courts are in session for only a few weeks each year, 
they may benefit greatly from a combination of adherence to preset trial dates 
determined by the case’s complexity and strict limitation of continuances. By using fixed 
trial dates, the courts can identify the court session, date, and time at which the trial will 
occur. This predictability enables courts to rely on their calendar and schedule other 
court dates with greater certainty, increasing efficient use of judges’ time. The courts 
can also adopt a policy of granting continuances only when absolutely necessary. The 
limitation of unnecessary continuances will enable courts to more accurately predict 
demand on and eliminate waste of court resources. By uniting these policies, courts like 
the Fairfax County Circuit Court have created a cascading effect where time saved on 
each case enables the court to more quickly address the next case. When cases are 
addressed predictably and efficiently, courts also capture fines and fees that are lost 
through out-of-court arrangements and reduce opportunities for abuse of the justice 
process among law enforcement, prosecutors, and defendants. By adopting fixed trial 
date policies, the Phillips County courts can address its ongoing problem with cases 
pending for long periods of time by resolving cases more quickly and enabling the 
courts to address new cases more promptly.  
 d. Data Collection 
 
Courts practicing case management often collect and analyze data in order to assess 
their ability to move cases through the justice system in a timely manner. Courts 
measure both the amount of time between filing and disposition and the size and age of 
their caseload.123 Tracking these metrics enables courts to assess the current status of 
their caseloads and create realistic, achievable goals for improving court processes and 
procedures. These procedural improvements help courts reduce waste of their 
resources, shorten their dockets, and ensure that every case is resolved in accordance 
with the law. Many courts use CourTools, an online software application, to track their 
progress according to metrics including clearance rate, time to disposition, age of active 
pending caseload, trial date certainty, and reliability of case files.124 Once caseflow 
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management standards are in place, courts can use CourTools to determine their 
current performance, the areas in which they would like to focus performance 
improvements, and performance targets. Taking these steps enables courts to monitor 
the effectiveness of implemented changes to their case management systems and 
make changes to their implementation of caseflow management training and standards 
as needed.  
 
The Phillips County courts should consider adopting CourTools in order to evaluate their 
progress as they develop and implement case management strategies. CourtTools will 
help the courts track changes in lengths of time to disposition and caseload size in an 
objective manner. As part of its overall adoption of caseflow management principles and 
strategies, the Phillips County courts could use data collection to assess where 
improvement is most needed and then track its improvement along objective metrics. 
Data collection also may help the courts identify areas of the justice process that are 
most vulnerable to abuse by prosecutors or defendants. Moving forward, the courts can 
also use data collection both to assess its improvement internally and as objective 
criteria in announcing its improvements to the community.  Collecting and sharing data 
will also further promote transparency while may help increase public trust in the courts.  
C. Final Recommendations 
 
Phillips County’s chronic backlog of cases not only delays justice but it also enhances 
growing public distrust in the criminal justice system. The Phillips County courts would 
benefit from a systematic strategy aimed at integrating caseflow management into the 
courts’ daily operations. This report recommends that the courts take the following 
steps: 
1. Hire court managers for the Phillips County Circuit Court and the Phillips County 
District Court. If sufficient funds cannot be found for two court managers, the 
courts could discuss sharing personnel. The courts could also reassign current 
personnel if the personnel have sufficient capacity to take on new 
responsibilities. 
 
2. Train personnel to acquaint them with caseflow management principles and 
strategies. Court managers should enroll in the Arkansas Court Manager 
Program. If personnel will be unable to attend the program, then the courts 
should consider enrolling the personnel in online certification courses. If these 
options are not financially feasible, personnel should review the free courses and 
materials available through NCSC. 
 
3. Implement caseflow management standards. These standards should focus on 
enabling the courts to establish proactive control of cases through the following 
tactics: 
a. Early case intervention, including requiring counsel to schedule 
preliminary hearings or status meetings and/or jointly present a 
discovery/case management plan to the court; 
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b. Differentiated case management, including developing pre-determined 
tracks for “normal” and “complicated” cases and creating a system to 
assign cases to these tracks at the time of filing; 
c. Setting fixed trial dates and limiting continuances; and 
d. Using CourTools to track court performance data, including the amount of 
time between filing and disposition and the size and age of the court’s 
caseload, adopt CourTools. 
III. Judicial Ethics Recommendations 
 
Trust in the judicial system is not solely a technical matter of training and establishing 
effective court processes. Judges must apply the law fairly and consistently if the law is 
to be respected and enforced. The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct has affirmed 
this, declaring that judges must discharge their duties “fairly and impartially.”125 To 
protect this ideal of an impartial judiciary, the Arkansas Constitution protects a party’s 
right to disqualify a judge who has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.126 
 
In light of the importance of the judicial branch to maintaining rule of law and public 
trust, the potential for distrust of the judicial branch in Helena is particularly troubling. 
For example, Helena sitting Phillips County Circuit Court Judge L.T. Simes has been 
repeatedly sanctioned over the course of the last eight years, but he has retained his 
position on the bench.127 Moreover, recent corruption scandals involving other Arkansas 
judges underscore the contribution that Arkansas’ judicial ethics rules and its system of 
judicial elections make to the perception that local courts are corrupt. This is not an 
abstract concern: lack of trust in the Phillips County judiciary contributes to the bigger 
problems with law enforcement that are described elsewhere in this report. As one 
Helena official noted, “[i]f [people] don’t trust the law, [they] don’t trust the prosecutors, 
[they] don’t trust the courts,” the law will not be widely respected and cannot be widely 
enforced.128  
 
In order to bolster the integrity of the judiciary and the public’s trust in the rule of law, 
this report suggests three amendments to the Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics. First, 
additional rules regarding recusal and disqualification of judges who have received 
campaign contributions from a party, lawyer, or law firm appearing before them should 
be adopted. Second, there should be restrictions on judges’ ability to appoint substantial 
campaign donors to administrative positions. Third, additional reporting requirements for 
judges receiving gifts should be adopted.  
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It is important to note, however, that changes to the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct 
must be approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court.129 Therefore, it will be more difficult 
to make changes to the judicial code than it would be to pass a local ordinance or make 
other reforms at the city or county level. Since the recent passage of Amendment 80, 
which introduced non-partisan judicial elections, the majority of changes to the Code 
have been in the judicial campaign sections.130 Because Arkansas has only rarely made 
changes like the ones recommended in this section, and such changes must apply 
statewide, altering the Phillips County justice system is likely to be a statewide battle. 
A.  The Problem of Judicial Elections 
 
Arkansas is one of the many states in which judges are chosen by popular election 
rather than appointed by another branch of government.131 This is true for judges at 
every level of the judicial branch: Supreme Court justices are elected to their seats in a 
statewide election, judges on the Court of Appeals are elected within the district they 
serve, and Circuit Courts are elected at the most local level.132 Judicial elections in 
Arkansas are “non-partisan,” which means that judges may not run as a member of a 
political party,133 and judges and justices may not run for non-judicial office.134 They are 
not subject to term limits. 
 
Many scholars have noted the tension between the ideal of an impartial judiciary and 
judicial elections.135 Judges may be influenced by the effect that their decision in a 
particular case would have on reelection. One recent study of criminal sentencing 
practices found that Kansas judges increased incarceration rates for black defendants 
by 10% in election years.136 Moreover, because elections are expensive, campaigning 
requires that judges and justices raise substantial funds—first to run for an initial seat, 
and then to run periodic reelection campaigns.137 The same individuals donating to a 
judge’s reelection fund may—and, in fact, are likely to—then appear as a party or 
advocate before that judge.  
 
Recent events in Arkansas validate the concern that campaign contributions may 
corrupt the state’s judiciary. On January 9, 2015, former Circuit Judge Mike Maggio pled 
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guilty to accepting bribes – through campaign contributions – and allowing those bribes 
to influence his judicial decisions.138 In particular, Judge Maggio admitted to reducing a 
$5.2 million verdict against a nursing home because he had received campaign 
contributions from the nursing home’s owner.139 The scope of the problem is not limited 
to Judge Maggio. Three of the seven Arkansas Supreme Court Justices—Rhonda 
Wood, Robin Wynne, and Karen Baker—have accepted campaign contributions from 
the same nursing home owner.140 These events underscore the potential dangers that 
judicial elections create and highlight the importance of having reliable safeguards 
against corruption. 
B. Recusal and Disqualification Amendment 
 
If judges are biased in favor of or against one of the parties in front of her, they should 
not hear the case. Under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are required to 
disqualify themselves (this is called “recusal”) when their “impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.”141 The main guiding document for judicial ethics is the Arkansas Code 
of Judicial Conduct, which establishes ethical standards that form the basis for 
disciplinary proceedings by the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability 
Commission.142  Under the amorphous standards provided, judges have a huge amount 
of discretion to decide whether a conflict is significant enough to trigger disqualification. 
The lack of concrete guidelines for judges, coupled with the Code’s reliance on self-
policing, is not only a problem for judges who are actively compromised. It would be 
difficult for a judge to make an accurate assessment of her own impartiality. If a judge 
does not voluntarily recuse herself, a party may file a motion for disqualification to 
request that another judge hear the case. However, because a party may not even be 
aware of the conflict of interest or whether it is sufficient to justify disqualifying a judge, 
relying on litigants to police judges will likely result in under-enforcement. Additional 
concrete standards and reporting requirements to determine when judges should seek 
recusal, and when litigants can seek disqualification, would help address these 
problems. 
 
Some states have adopted recusal rules that specifically address the situations in which 
a campaign donation poses a potential threat to the integrity of legal proceedings. Most 
of these rules were adopted within the last five years, following a U.S. Supreme Court 
case in which the Court strongly recommended that states pass their own laws 
governing judicial ethics and campaign contributions.143 For example, in Tennessee and 
Oklahoma’s judicial codes, judicial recusal is required when a party has donated a high 
enough amount to a judge’s campaign that the judge’s impartiality might be “reasonably 
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questioned” because of it.144 Other states require recusal when a party has donated 
more than a specific dollar amount.145 (The amount ranges from $50 (Utah to $2,500 
(New York)).146 In 2014, Alabama passed a law creating a “rebuttable presumption” of 
mandatory recusal where one party in the case raised more than a certain percentage 
of total contributions to a judge during an election cycle (10% for a Supreme Court 
Justice, 15% for a circuit court judge, and 25% for a district court judge).147 ABA Model 
Rule 2.11(A)(4) calls for the recusal of a judge from a case when one of the parties in a 
case have contributed above a specific aggregate amount to the judge’s campaign.148  
 
In contrast, the only Arkansas rule providing specific guidance for recusal when a party 
has donated to a judge’s campaign is an anemic comment to Rule 2.11 of its Code of 
Judicial Conduct. The comment notes that the fact that a lawyer or party contributed to 
a judge’s election fund “does not itself disqualify the judge” but acknowledges that such 
donations “may raise questions as to the judge’s impartiality.”149 Thus, Arkansas judges 
have significant discretion when deciding whether to recuse themselves or grant a 
motion for disqualification, and they may be disinclined to acknowledge that their 
impartiality has been compromised. 
 
Adopting a version of the Model Rule 2.11(A)(4) into the Code of Judicial Conduct 
would be one step in the right direction for Arkansas. In deciding upon this aggregate 
amount, Arkansas can look to other states for guidance. In some states, where the 
spending on judicial elections in relatively low, mandatory recusal can be required even 
where the donated amount was relatively low (Utah’s $50 restriction is based on 
application of the ABA rule)150 Alternatively, a more flexible approach, like the laws 
creating a rebuttable presumption of mandatory recusal when one party is connected to 
a major donor, could avoid potential “gamesmanship” or mandatory disqualification 
where it is unnecessary. In February 2015, Arkansas House Representative John Baine 
(D) introduced a bill, HB 1457, modeled after Alabama’s “rebuttable presumption” rule 
for high-percentage donors to a judge’s campaign.151 The bill was withdrawn by its 
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author on March 12, 2015, but it is still available online.152 If passed, this bill (or a similar 
one that creates limits on the amount that parties or their lawyers can donate to a 
judge’s election campaign) would be a step in the direction of addressing judicial 
corruption. 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that the ABA Model Rule and similar rules requiring 
dismissal based on the contribution amount reach only direct campaign contributions, 
not independent campaign expenditures. An amendment to Arkansas’ ethics code 
should include these indirect contributions as well, to ensure that potentially corrupt 
donors and judges cannot sidestep the ethics rules.  
C. Administrative Appointments 
 
In addition to their substantial power in deciding cases, judges also have the power to 
make administrative appointments. Administrative appointments include potentially 
lucrative or powerful positions like special investigators, administrative law judges, or 
special fact-finders for a court. Just as the possibility of judges deciding cases based on 
campaign contributions is a risk to a well-functioning, impartial judicial system, the 
possibility of judges exercising their power to make appointments as a favor to 
campaign donors risks turning the judicial system into an extended system of 
patronage. If people are appointed to key administrative positions because of their 
donations instead of their reliability or skills, the appointed individuals may not be well-
suited for the job. 
 
Most state ethics codes, including Arkansas, have restrictions on the factors that a 
judge can consider in making such an appointment; they must “avoid nepotism, 
favoritism, and unnecessary appointments.”153 However, Arkansas judges are not 
restricted under the administrative appointments ethics rules from appointing substantial 
campaign contributors. Under ABA Model Rule 2.13(B), judges may not appoint 
campaign contributors or their families to administrative positions, if those contributors 
donated more than a specified amount in a given time frame.154 Adopting a rule like this 
would help ensure that Arkansas judges could not hand out beneficial positions to their 
patrons.  This is likely to reduce both the actual occurrence and public perception of 
corruption and induce more faith within the courts.  
D. Gift Reporting Requirements 
 
Campaign contributions are, of course, not the only method by which judges can be 
improperly swayed. The Arkansas judiciary made news in 2013, for example, when it 
was reported that an Arkansas Supreme Court justice, Justice Courtney Goodson, had 
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accepted a trip to Italy valued at $50,000 from a lawyer who argued frequently in the 
Supreme Court.155  The same concerns about judges adjudicating cases involving 
parties who donated heavily to their campaigns apply to judges adjudicating cases 
involving parties who give gifts: their impartiality may be compromised or, at least, 
called into question. Rulings from judges who are—or seem to be—indebted to one side 
in a legal dispute are unreliable and untrustworthy. 
 
Gifts to judges are not subject to the same reporting requirements that political 
campaigns are; instead, judges are usually required under separate ethics rules to 
report the gifts they receive to the public. The ABA Model Rule 3.13 for gift reporting 
specifies how often and where a judge must report the amount and value of gifts 
received, as well as information detailing the nature of any activity for which the judge 
received compensation, the date of the activity, and a description of anything received 
of value.156  In contrast, the Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics only requires judges to 
report the value itself of gifts they received. They are not required to provide a 
description of the gift or corresponding information that verifies their report.157  These 
loose reporting requirements allow actual and potential corruption to fly under the 
state’s radar.  Adopting additional requirements, such as the Model Rule 3.13, would 
provide better guidance for judges as to gift reporting, as well as give them more factors 
for consideration in determining the appropriateness of such gifts. Further, this reporting 
will provide more oversight and supervision of judicial behavior in regards to these gifts 
which will help to reassure the public that their judges are not up for sale. 
E. Final Recommendations 
 
Loose standard and limited reporting requirements in the Arkansas Code of Judicial 
Ethics provide opportunities for potential and perceived corruption within the court.  In 
order to reduce these opportunities and promote optimal judicial behavior, it is 
recommended that Phillips County advocate for the following revisions:   
: 
1. Adopt clearer, more stringent recusal and disqualification restrictions for judges, 
specifically those outlined in ABA Model Rule 2.11(A)(4).  In regards to 
determining an appropriate aggregate amount, Arkansas Code of Judicial Ethics 
can look to other states for guidance; 
 
2. Adopt an amendment to current administrative appointment regulations that 
restricts judges from appointing family members and campaign contributors.  
This amendment could incorporate a complete bar on appointing both categories, 
or, similar to ABA Model Rule 2.13(B), restrict the appointment of contributors 
who have donated specified amounts within a pre-determined time frame;  
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3. Adopt stronger reporting requirements for judicial gift reporting, as outlined in 
ABA Model Rule 3.13. 
Conclusion 
 
Law enforcement and justice systems require public cooperation if they are to function 
properly. When members of the community see the police as out-of-touch, corrupt, or 
incompetent, they are less likely to report crimes or cooperate with law enforcement 
practices. When the court system is inefficient and unreliable, the deterrent effect of 
threatened prosecution is severely compromised. And, when the judicial system itself is 
seen as compromised, and judges’ impartiality is in question, enforcing the rule of law is 
difficult. 
 
This report attempts to address the problems of distrust and corruption in Helena-West 
Helena’s public institutions. Some of the solutions suggested—such as implementing 
community policing and caseflow management techniques—can be implemented 
quickly, while others—particularly the changes to the judicial ethics code—are longer-
term goals that would require changes at the state level. Although reform presents 
challenges, Helena stands to benefit by strengthening community trust in its institutions. 
 
